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Abstract
This paper analyses the (self-)selection of migrants between coun-
tries which have substantial di®erences in the inequality of earnings
and income levels. In an extended version of the Roy-model we
consider migration costs, which tend to grow less than proportional
with the income level. As a consequence, migrants can be favourably
self-selected although the inequality of earnings is larger in the
destination relative to the sending country. Based on a novel panel
data set, covering migration from 143 sending countries all over
the world into the 6 main receiving countries in the OECD from
1975 to 2000, we examine the factors which drive the selection bias
of the migrant population empirically. The descriptive statistics
indicate that migrants tend to be positively (self-)selected although
the inequality in earnings is larger in the destination relative to the
sending countries. Our estimation results suggest that both, a higher
inequality in the distribution of earnings in the receiving and the
sending country increases the skill level of the migrant population
relative to that of the population in the sending countries. Moreover,
the positive selection bias decreases with the income level of the
sending country at a given income di®erential. Finally, migration
barriers and distance a®ect the selection bias positively.
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11 Introduction
The skill bias of migration is highly relevant from both the perspective of
the sending and receiving countries. In the traditional brain drain litera-
ture, which dates back to the 1960s and 1970s, economists and policy-makers
were concerned that the loss of human capital associated with international
migration is detrimental to economic development in the sending countries
(Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; Grubel and Scott, 1966; Kwok and Leland,
1982). Although the "new economics of the brain drain" literature suggests
that international migration might foster human capital investment in the
sending countries (Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport, 2001; Stark, Helmenstein,
and Prskawetz, 1997), which in turn may increase economic growth and wel-
fare (Mountford, 1997), there are still fears that labour mobility involves a
net loss in human capital for the senders.
In contrast, from the perspective of the receiving countries, there are in-
creasing concerns that the skill levels of migrants are declining over time,
which in turn generates more and more problems in terms of social and
economic integration. The academic background for these concerns forms
the seminal paper by George Borjas (1987), which applies the classical Roy
(1951) model to the migration context. The Roy model o®ers a rigorous and
theoretically powerful framework to analyse the self-selection of individuals.
According to the Roy model, self-selection is driven by comparative advan-
tage of individuals. As a consequence, the distribution of income in receiving
and sending countries determines whether individuals with higher or lower
abilities tend to migrate: if the distribution of income in the host country
is more equal than in the home country, and if the incomes of (potential)
migrants in both locations are su±ciently positively correlated, migrants are
chosen from the lower tail of the income distribution and vice versa (Borjas,
1987, pp. 551-52).
This has important policy consequences: since rich countries have on
average a higher equality in the distribution of earnings than poor countries,
the Roy model predicts that migrants from poor countries are unfavourably
selected with regard to their skills and other abilities relevant for their labour
market performance. The negative selection bias of the migrant population
in OECD countries may increase over time, since more and more migrants
come from poor countries.
In its original formulation the Roy (1951) model does not consider any
switching costs, and the Borjas (1987) model assumes that moving costs are
proportional to the income level. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary migration
costs play however an important role in migration decisions, and it is rea-
sonable to assume that skills and abilities relevant for the labour market
2performance of individuals a®ect moving costs. The same human capital
characteristics which yield higher returns in the labour market are likely to
reduce individual moving costs. At least it is likely that the share of migra-
tion costs in income tends to decline with increasing income. However, if we
assume that the share of income which has to be spend for migration costs is
decreasing in the income level, migrants may be chosen from the upper tail of
the income distribution although the distribution of income in the receiving
country is more equal than in the sending country.1
In the context of international migration, it was di±cult to falsify the
predictions of the Roy-model since micro data sets which contain individu-
als in sending and receiving countries were not available. Meanwhile novel
data sets exist (Carrington and Detragiache, 1998; Defoort, 2006; Docquier
and Marfouk, 2005), which provide macro information on the skill levels of
migrants by country of origin. More speci¯cally, these data sets distinguish
migrants in OECD countries by skill levels. The overwhelming share of these
migrants stems from developing countries. The data on the skill composi-
tion of the migrant population can be related to the skill composition of the
native population in the sending countries. Although unobservable abilities,
which might be relevant for the labour market performance, are not covered,
these data sets allow at least to analyse the selection-bias of migrants with
regard to their observable education levels.
At ¯rst glance, it looks as if migrants tend to be positively self-selected.
Table 1 displays for the 6 main receiving countries in the OECD (Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, USA, UK) the share of migrants in the labour
force of 143 sending countries distinguished by skill levels from 1975 to 2000.
The share of migrants is among the skilled workers around three times larger
than among the unskilled workers, although the inequality in earnings mea-
sured by the Gini-coe±cient is larger in the sending countries than in the
receiving countries. Moreover, this tendency seems to be rather stable over
time.
Table 1 about here
However, this does not say that the inequality of earnings does not a®ect
the (self-)selection of migrants. An increase in the inequality of earnings
1A similar point has been made by Chiswick (2000): He demonstrates in a numerical
example, that the strong implications of the Roy model are relaxed if we assume that
moving costs are a ¯xed amount rather than a constant share of income. The point we
make here is more general: We only assume that migration costs tend to grow less than
proportional with the income level.
3in the receiving relative to the sending country may increase the favourable
selection bias and vice versa.
In this paper, we ¯rst analyse, drawing on a similar approach by BrÄ ucker
and TrÄ ubswetter (2006), in an extended Roy-model how di®erences in the
structure of earnings a®ect the skill distribution of migrants. The model
determines the skill bias of migrants in dependence on the average income
level, the inequality of earnings, and migration costs. We ¯nd, in contrast to
the predictions of the standard Roy model, that the inequality of earnings
has an ambiguous impact on the self-selection of migrants.
Second, we examine the correlation between the inequality of earnings,
income levels and factors which may a®ect migration costs and the selection
bias of earnings empirically. Our regression results indicate (i) that an in-
creasing inequality of earnings in both, the receiving and the sending country
increases the favourable selection bias of migrants, (ii) that a higher di®er-
ence in per capita income levels has a negative impact on the selection bias,
and (iii) that higher migration costs and higher migration barriers tend to
be positively correlated with the skill bias of the migrant population.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines our
version of a generalised Roy model, which considers the correlation between
migration costs and skill levels. Section 3 presents the data set and our
empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
Suppose that w1 is the wage of residents in the home country (country 1),
and w2 the wage of residents in the host country (country 2). Assume that
log wages in country 1 and country 2 have a joint normal distribution, such
that
lnw1 = ¹1 + "1; (1)
where ¹1 is the mean of the log wage in country 1 and "1 a normally dis-
tributed disturbance with zero mean and variance ¾2
1. Analogously,
lnw2 = ¹2 + "2; (2)
where "2 is normally distributed with zero mean and variance ¾2
2. The Roy
model focuses on the impact of selection bias on the disturbances "1 and "2,
which can be interpreted as the premium for skills and other abilities. Since
we cannot distinguish in our data between the impact of individual abilities
and education levels, we assume here that a mapping between individual
wages and skill levels exists, such that the wage is monotonically increasing
4in the skill level of individuals in both countries.
The original Roy model ignores all switching costs, i.e. an individual from
country 1 migrates into country 2 if w2 > w1, while Borjas (1987) treats mov-
ing costs as a constant share of the income level for all individuals. However,
it is reasonable to assume that moving costs exist and that they are related to
human capital characteristics and other abilities of individuals. Suppose that
c represents the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of migration as a pro-
portion of home income. Migration occurs if
w2¡w1
w1 > c, or, approximately,
if lnw2 ¡ lnw1 > c. Assume that c is normally distributed with mean ° and
disturbance ´, i.e.
c = ° + ´; (3)
and that ´ » N(0;¾2
´). The decision to migrate is then determined by the
sign of the index function, I¤, which contains the wage gain from moving
minus the costs of migration:
I
¤ = ¹2 ¡ ¹1 ¡ ° + "2 ¡ "1 ¡ ´; (4)





Var("2 ¡ "1 ¡ ´); z = ¡
¹2 ¡ ¹1 ¡ °
¾¤ ; and ² =
"2 ¡ "1 ¡ ´
¾¤ :
Migration occurs if ² > z. Under the normality assumptions, the share
of migrants in the population, mst, is given by
mst = Pr(² > z) = 1 ¡ ©(z); (5)
where ©() is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.
Using the standard sample selection formula (Heckman, 1976, 1979), the
wage of a migrant in the home country can be written as
E(lnw1jI
¤ > 0) = ¹1 + ¾1²¸(z); (6)
and the wage in the host country as
E(lnw2jI
¤ > 0) = ¹2 + ¾2²¸(z); (7)
where ¾1² and ¾2² are the covariance of "1 and ², and the covariance of "2




5is the inverse of Mills' ratio and Á() the density of the standard normal.
Whether migrants are favourably or unfavourably self-selected depends
on the sign of the second term in the equations (6) and (7). Since ¸(z) ¸ 0 by
de¯nition, the average migrant has higher skills than the average person in
the home country if ¾1² > 0, and, analogously, higher skills than the average
person in the host country if ¾2² > 0 { if we ignore the limiting case that
¸(z) = 0.
An interpretation of these conditions requires that we decompose ¾1² and








2 ¡ ¾12 ¡ ¾2´
¾¤ :
Thus, we can derive two fundamental conditions for the favourable self-
selection of migrants: ¯rstly, migrants are better o® than the average person
in the home population if ¾12 > ¾2












where ½12 is the correlation coe±cient between "1 and "2, and ½1´ the corre-
lation coe±cient between "1 and ´. We assume for the further analysis that
½12 > 0, since a negative correlation would imply that individuals which have
a higher income in the source country have a lower in the receiving country
and vice versa, which would not make much sense economically. Note that
the second term on the right-hand side captures the correlation between in-
come and moving costs. Since we assume that labour-market abilities and
the share of moving costs c are negatively correlated, i.e. that ½1´ < 0, the
second term is negative, and, hence, increases the probability of a favourable
selection of migrants relative to the average person in the home population
for a given variance of earnings in the host and the home country.
Secondly, the migrant is better o® than the average person in the host
country if ¾2
2 > ¾12 + ¾2´ , or if
¾2
¾1




where ½2´ is the correlation coe±cient between "2 and ´. Once again, since
we assume that ½2´ < 0, the second term on the right-hand side increases
6the probability of a favourable selection of migrants relative to the average
person in the host population for a given variance of earnings in the host and
the home country.
Comparative Statics
Consider now the implications of the model for a change in the economic con-
ditions underlying the (self-)selection of migrants. We can write the selection
bias of migrants relative to the average person in the home population as
Sj = Sj (!;c;¾1;¾2;´;½12;½1´;½2´); j 2 f1;2g
where ! ´ ¹2 ¡ ¹1 is the di®erence in mean incomes between the host and
the home country. The second terms in equations (6) and (7) show that the
selection bias in the home country is given by
S1 = ¾1²¸(z);
and in the host country by
S2 = ¾2²¸(z):
We can thus write the impact of a change in any variable x on the change in




















The ¯rst term on the right hand side in equations (10) and (11) captures the
composition e®ect for a constant scale of migration, and the second term the
scale e®ect for a given composition of the migrant population (Borjas, 1987).
We focus here on the selection bias of migrants relative to the average








¾1, i.e. if migrants are positively selected, and a negative
one, if otherwise.
Consider ¯rst the impact of a change in the inequality of earnings on the











7where the sign of the ¯rst term { the composition e®ect { is positive if
2¾1 (¾1 ¡ ½12¾2 + ½1´¾´)
2 > (2¾1 ¡ ½12¾2 + ½1´¾´)¾¤2, which depends on the
value of the parameters.2
The impact of the second term { the scale e®ect { depends on the sign of
z. If the net di®erence in mean earnings (incl. moving costs) is positive (i.e.
z < 0), the scale e®ect is negative, and positive if otherwise. Intuitively, a
positive (negative) selection bias tend to disappear since the share of migrants
from the upper (lower) end of the skill distribution tend to decline with an
increasing number of migrants.
The e®ect of an increasing inequality of earnings in the host country is
again ambiguous. Analogously to equation (12), a derivation of S2 with




¾1 (½12 ¾¤2 ¡ k n)






where n is de¯ned as ¾2 + ½12¾1 ¡ ½23¾´ > 0. The composition e®ect has a
positive sign if ½12¾¤2 > kn, which is always the case if a negative selection
bias of the migrant population exists. In the converse case the sign of the
composition e®ect depends on the sign of the individual parameters. The
scale e®ect is positive if migrants are positively selected and the net di®erence
in earnings between the host and the home country is positive (i.e. z <
0), and negative in the converse case. Thus, an increase in the inequality
of earnings in the host country strengthens a given selection bias in both
directions via the scale e®ect if the di®erence in net earnings is positive,
while it reduces a negative selection bias via the composition e®ect, and is
ambiguous if a positive selection bias exists.
Lets consider now a change in the di®erence of earnings between the host









i.e. a change in the income di®erential a®ects the composition of migrants
only via the scale e®ect. An increase in the di®erence of earnings between
the host and the home country reduces the positive (negative) selection bias
of the migrant population if they are positively (negatively) selected. The
2Note that the sign of the composition e®ect remains ambiguous if we neglect the
correlation between labour market abilities and moving costs: The derivation of ¾1² with











2¡2½12¾1¾2)3 . It can be shown that this is positive if ½12(¾2
1 +
¾2)2 > 2¾1¾2.
8intuition behind this result is that a higher di®erence in earnings increases
the share of migrants in the population, which in turn reduces the selection
bias in both directions, since migrants are increasingly drawn from the mean
parts of the income distribution.









since increasing moving costs reduces the share of migrants in the population,
which in turn increases the selection bias of the migrant population.
Finally, we can assess the implications of a change in the correlation
coe±cients. The derivation of the change in S1 with respect to a change in




































In all three equations the composition e®ect and the scale e®ect have the
same sign if the net di®erence in mean earnings (incl. moving costs) between
the host and the home is positive (z < 0), and the converse sign if the net
di®erence in mean earnings is negative (z > 0). Thus, an increasing (positive)
correlation between earnings in the home and the host country strengthens
the selection bias both via the composition e®ect and the scale e®ect if the
net di®erence in earnings is positive. In contrast, an increasing (negative)
correlation between labour market abilities and moving costs weakens the
selection bias if the net di®erence in earnings is positive.
3 Empirical evidence
The results from our analysis of the generalised Roy model which consid-
ers migration costs can be summarised as follows: (i) a higher variance of
earnings in the home country does not necessarily a®ect the selection bias
of the migrant population unfavourably, (ii) a higher variance of earnings in
the host country does not necessarily a®ect the selection bias of the migrant
population favourably, (iii)increasing the di®erence in average earnings be-
9tween the host and the home country weakens a given selection bias of the
migrant population, (iv) increasing the mean migration costs raises a given
selection bias of the migrant population, and (v) a higher negative correla-
tion between migration costs and earnings a®ects the selection bias of the
migrant population favourably.
Thus, in contrast of the original Roy model which ignores switching costs,
we ¯nd an ambiguous impact of the inequality of earnings on the selection
bias of the migrant population. In this section we analyse how the distribu-
tion of earnings in the receiving countries relative to the sending countries
a®ects and some institutional variables a®ect the skill composition of mi-
grants. The empirical analysis is based on a novel set of macro migration
data, which allows to distinguish migration stocks by their educational at-
tainment. This data is used to calculate the share of skilled and unskilled
migrants in the home population. We can thus examine whether the (i) in-
equality of earnings in the host country, (ii) the inequality of earnings in the
home country, (iii) the di®erence in mean earnings, and (iv) various approx-
imations for migration costs a®ect the self-selection of migrant with respect
to their skill levels.






jkt) = a0 + a1µjt + a2µkt + °
0Xjkt + ´
0Yjt + ¸
0Zkt + ²jkt; (19)
where sh and sl are the shares of skilled and unskilled migrants, respectively,
residing in receiving country j as a share of the skilled labour force and
the unskilled labour force, respectively, in sending country k, µ is a measure
for the inequality in earnings, X, Y and Z are sets of variables which may
a®ect the bene¯ts and costs of migration in the host country, home country
and both, °, ´ and ¸ are the associated vectors of coe±cients, and ² is the
error term. The index j = 1;2:::6 denotes the receiving country, the index
k = 1;2:::143 the sending country, and the index t = 1;2:::6 the time period.
Following Hsiao (1986), we specify the error term as a two-way error
components model, i.e. as
²jkt = ¹jk + ºt + "jkt; (20)
where ¹jk is a bilateral ¯xed e®ect, ºt a time-speci¯c ¯xed e®ect and "jkt
white noise. We also estimate a pooled version of the model without ¯xed
e®ects.
10As a measure for the inequality of earnings we use the Gini-coe±cients
in the respective countries. Other inequality measures such as the variance
of earnings might be more appropriate for our purposes, but we rely on the
Gini-coe±cient since this is the only measure which is available for a broad
set of countries.
In the most parsimonious speci¯cation of the model we consider only the
Gini-coe±cients as explanatory variables. Step by step we extend the model
by other variables which may a®ect the skill distribution of migrants. First,
we use the log of the per capita income di®erential between the receiving and
the sending country and the log GDP in the sending country as additional
explanatory variables. According to our theoretical model, the income dif-
ferential should weaken a given selection bias via the scale e®ect. Since the
descriptive statistics indicate that the migrants from most of our countries
have a favourable skill-bias, we shall expect a negative or insigni¯cant sign
for this variable.
The per capita income in the sending country may a®ect liquidity con-
straints, and, hence, the composition of the migrant population (Faini and
Venturini, 1995). Since the relaxation of liquidity constraints increases the
opportunities of unskilled individuals to migrate more than proportional, we
expect again a negative sign for this variable.
Second, we consider variables which may a®ect the costs of migration and
migration barriers. The ¯rst among these variables is geographical distance,
which is considered as an approximation for transport and communication
costs. In general it can be expected that unskilled migrants bene¯t more
from an overall reduction of migration costs than skilled migrants, such that
we expect a negative coe±cient for this variable. As institutional variables
which approximate migration barriers we consider colonial links between the
sending and the receiving country, bilateral migration agreements and the
free movement of workers within the EU. All three variables tend to reduce
migration barriers, and, hence, increase the number of migrants. We expect
that these variables a®ect the skill composition of migrants negatively for
three reasons: First, analogously to transport and communication costs, re-
duced migration barriers imply lower costs for migration, which increases the
incentives and opportunities of unskilled individuals more than proportional.
Second, migration barriers have in many cases a skill-bias, i.e. many coun-
tries which restrict migration tend to out-select unskilled individuals. Hence,
a reduction of migration barriers increases the migration chances of unskilled
individuals more than proportional. Third, reducing migration barriers af-
fects the composition of the migrant population also via the scale a®ect. If
migrants are favourable self-selected on average, than this favourable selec-
tion bias disappears with an increasing number of migrants. Altogether, we
11expect a negative coe±cient for the distance variable and all three variables,
which approximate a reduction of institutional migration barriers.
Finally, we consider a democracy index as a variable which should cap-
ture the political 'push' factors in the sending countries. This variable may
a®ect migration incentives di®erently for skilled and unskilled individuals
and, hence, a®ect the skill composition of the migrant population. However,
it is hard to predict ex ante in which direction the selection bias is a®ected
by this variable. It depends on whether high skilled individuals are more or
less a®ected by push factors such as political instability or a lack of political
freedom. The expected signs of the parameters of the model are summarised
in Table 2.
Table 2 about here
The model is estimated in most regressions in static form. This seems
to us a reasonably approach, since we have in our data set only one ob-
servation every ¯ve years and the main explanatory variables such as the
Gini-coe±cients and per capita income levels have a high stability over time.
However, we estimated the model also in dynamic form. In order to address
the so-called Nickell-bias we used the GMM-system estimator developed by
Arellano and Bover (1995).
Data
The data set which is employed here has been collected by Defoort (2006),
and builds on previous contributions by Docquier and Marfouk (2005). The
data set uses data from OECD countries on the skill levels of the migrants
population for residents from (almost) all countries of the world. In addition
to previous contributions, this data set expands the time-dimension and pro-
vides data for 6 receiving countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
UK, USA) for the years 1975 to 2000 (one observation each 5 years). This
allows to carry out a panel analysis. For a detailed description of the data
set see the Annex A.
For balanced panel estimation, we consider in this paper only bilateral
pairs where we have data for all 6 time periods, which gives for the 143
sending and 6 receiving countries 705 bilateral relations and a total of 4,230
balanced panel observations.
We distinguish two types of individuals: skilled and unskilled. An in-
dividual is de¯ned as skilled if it has an educational attainment of 9 years
12of schooling or more, and as unskilled if it has 8 years or less. We assume
that this distinction corresponds to the distinction between individuals which
have completed secondary education and those which have not in our sam-
ple. Note that around 70 per cent of the population in the sending countries
belong to the non-skilled group. For the skill level of the migrant population
data on the educational structure by country of birth for the working-age
population has been used from OECD sources (see Annex A).
The most important explanatory variable is the measure for the inequality
of earnings. We employ the Gini-coe±cients provided by the World Devel-
opment Reports from the World Bank. The missing observations have been
estimated using a model which regresses the Gini-coe±cient against the per
capita GDP level and a country speci¯c ¯xed e®ect. The explanatory power
of this simple model has been relatively high, such that the estimated Gini-
coe±cient can be used as a relatively good proxy for the missing observations.
For the income variable, we use the GDP per capita in purchasing power
parity at constant prices from the World Development Indicators of the World
Bank. The distance variable captures the distance between the capitals of the
sending countries and the destination country in km. Moreover, we consider
the following institutional variables which a®ect migration restrictions: a free
movement dummy, which has a value of 1 if there is free movement between
the sending and the receiving country,3 an agreement dummy, if there is a
bilateral guestworker agreement or another bilateral agreement which enables
migration between the sending the receiving country at least partially, and a
colonial link dummy, if the sending country is a former colony of the receiving
country. Finally, we consider a variable which captures the political freedom
in the sending country: the democracy index from the World Development
Indicators of the World Bank. This index is scaled between 0 and 1.
The descriptive statics of the variables are displayed in annex table A1.
Estimation results
We estimate two versions of the model in equation (19): First, a pooled model
without ¯xed e®ects, and, second, a model with country-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects.
Although our tests suggest a ¯xed-e®ects speci¯cation (see below), we esti-
mate in the ¯rst step a pooled version of the panel model. Note that the
coe±cients are identi¯ed in the ¯xed-e®ects model by the within-dimension,
which may generate an identi¯cation problem if the variance of our vari-
ables is small over time. Since the Gini-coe±cients and income variables are
relatively stable, this might be an issue in our sample.
3Note that free movement is only relevant for the receiving countries in the EU
13The results of the pooled regressions are displayed in Table 3. The sign
of the coe±cients for the most important variables, the Gini-coe±cients of
the host and the home countries, are both positive and highly signi¯cant.
However, the size of the estimated parameter for the Gini-co±cient in the
receiving countries is much larger than that for the sending countries.
Thus, an increasing inequality of earnings in both, the host and the home
country, has a positive impact on the selection bias of the migrant population.
While the ¯rst result con¯rms the predictions of the standard version of the
Roy model, the second results clearly contradicts it. However, this result is
consistent with the expectations of our extended Roy model, which allows
for a negative correlation between skill levels and individual moving costs.
Table 3 about here
The results for the income variables are also in line with our theoretical
expectations. We obtain a negative sign for the income di®erential between
the home and the host country as well as for the income level in the home
country. Thus, increasing the income di®erential between countries reduces
the favourable selection bias. Moreover, the negative sign of the coe±cient for
the income level in the sending countries indicates that liquidity constraints
matter, i.e. that more and more unskilled migrants can a®ord to migrate if
the per capita income level tends to increase in the source country.
Finally, we receive a positive sign for the distance variable and negative
ones for the bilateral guestworker agreement and colonial tie dummy vari-
ables, indicating that higher transport and communication costs increase the
positive selection bias, while relaxing migration barriers reduce it. We obtain
only an unexpected sign for the free movement dummy, which suggests that
removing migration barriers within the EU is associated with a higher share
of skilled migrants. Moreover, the democracy-index has a negative sign, in-
dicating that a higher level of political freedom involves a lower proportion
of skilled migration.
Our speci¯cation tests suggest that the ¯xed e®ects are both, individually
and jointly, signi¯cant. Moreover, the Hausman-test clearly rejects a random-
e®ects speci¯cation. We estimated the ¯xed e®ects model with a feasible
GLS estimator, which allows for group-speci¯c heteroscedasticity. Our LR-
Test clearly suggests that heteroscedasticity is present in our data set (see
the regression diagnostics in Table 4).4
4However, the LR-Test does not reject the hypothesis of no contemporary correlation.
14Table 4 about here
In the static speci¯cation of the ¯xed-e®ects model, the sign of the Gini-
coe±cient in the receiving country remains positive and highly signi¯cant.
However, the sign of the Gini-coe±cient in the sending country has also a
positive sign, but appears insigni¯cant. This might be caused by the rela-
tively low within-variance in our data. The coe±cients for the income dif-
ferential have again a negative sign but are insigni¯cant as well. Only home
income has a signi¯cant negative sign. The free movement dummy and the
guestworker agreement variable have a positive sign.
The dynamic version of the model is estimated with the GMM-System
estimator in order to control for the simultaneous equation bias (Nickell,
1981). Note that GMM-estimation is appropriate in our data set with a
small time dimension (T = 5) and large group dimension (N = 705) (Judson
and Owen, 1999).
The estimation results of the dynamic model are largely in line with
those from the pooled OLS regressions: Both the Gini-coe±cients in the
host and the home country have positive signs and appear highly signi¯cant,
while the income variables have negative signs and are signi¯cant as well.
Moreover, both the guestworker agreement and the free movement dummies
have negative signs and appear as signi¯cant.
Given the rather short-time dimension of our panel and possible adjust-
ment processes, the GMM-estimates of the dynamic model might be more
reliable than the ¯xed e®ects estimates of the static model. Thus, we con-
clude that a higher inequality in earnings in the host countries can increase
the favourable selection bias, while the same holds true for the sending coun-
tries. Moreover, increasing the costs of migration a®ects the selection bias
positively, while relaxing the barriers to migration has the opposite e®ect.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have ¯rst analysed on basis of a generalised Roy model the
forces which may a®ect the selection bias of the migration population. In
contrast to the traditional Roy model, which ignores moving costs or treats
them as a uniform share of the income, we ¯nd that the inequality of earnings
has an ambiguous impact on the self-selection of the migrant population if
we consider that the share of income which has to be spend for migration
is declining in the income level. This has important consequences for the
15sending countries: Increasing the inequality of earnings in source countries
may yield an even higher brain drain for countries which su®er already from
emigration of the skilled population.
Given the ambiguity of our theoretical ¯ndings, it is important to examine
the empirical evidence. Based on our novel panel data set we ¯nd ¯rst
descriptive evidence that migrants tend to be favourably self-selected with
regard to their skill level on average, although the earnings inequality is much
higher in the sending countries relative to the recipients. This descriptive
evidence seems to contradict the standard predictions of the Roy-model.
However, our regression analysis which allow to control for certain factors
provides a number of additional insights: We ¯nd evidence that (i) a higher
inequality of earnings in the receiving countries, and (ii) a higher inequal-
ity of earnings in the sending countries is both positively correlated with a
favourable selection bias. The latter result seems, against the background
of our theoretical considerations, to indicate that moving costs have a non-
trivial impact on the self-selection of migrants. This is also supported by
the fact that higher migration costs tend to be positively correlated with
a favourable selection bias, while lower migration barriers a®ect the self-
selection unfavourably.
Finally, the favourable selection bias tends to decline with an increasing
income di®erence between the home and the host country and a higher in-
come level in the home country. The rationale behind the ¯rst result is that a
higher income di®erence yields a higher share of migrants in the population,
and, hence, dilutes the positive selection bias. The latter result supports
the hypothesis that liquidity constraints play an important role in migra-
tion: While in poor countries only the rich and better educated parts of the
population can a®ord to migrate, the share of the unskilled is increasing in
the income level of the source countries, i.e. when liquidity constraints are
relaxed.
Thus, altogether, our theoretical and empirical ¯ndings seem to indicate
that a high inequality of earnings in the source countries does not prevent
a positive selection bias of the migrant population. While this is reassur-
ing news for the receiving countries, this need not to be the case for the
sending countries: They may su®er from a 'brain drain.' However, as the
'new economics of the brain drain' literature suggests, a positive selection of
the migrant population might be associated with additional human capital
investment, and need therefore not necessarily be a burden for the sending
countries. This, however, is a question for further research.
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18A Description of the data set
For the skill levels of the residents in the sending countries, we use pop-
ulation data from the United Nations and education data from Barro and
Lee (2000). We consider only individuals aged 25 or more. For countries
where the Barro and Lee measures are missing (about 70 countries in 2000),
we have transpose the skill share of the neighbouring country with the clos-
est human development index regarding education. This method gives good
approximations of the brain drain rate, broadly consistent with anecdotal
evidence.
Regarding migrants, there has been no systematic empirical assessment
of the educational structure of international migration until recently. Despite
numerous case studies and anecdotal evidence, many institutions consider the
lack of harmonized international data on migration by country of origin and
education level as the major problem for monitoring the scope and impact
of brain drain in developing areas. An exception can be found in Carrington
and Detragiache (1998) who provided estimates of the emigration stocks and
rates of tertiary educated workers for 61 developing countries in 1990. These
estimates are based on three main statistical sources (US Census data on
the skill structure of immigration, OECD data on immigration per country
of origin, Barro and Lee (2000) data describing the skill structure in sending
countries). Unfortunately, these estimates rely on two very strong assump-
tions: First, for non-US countries, they use OECD migration statistics which
report limited information on the origin of immigrants. Second, they trans-
pose the skill structure of US immigrants on the total immigration stock in
the OECD. Adams (2003) used the same methodology to update the emi-
gration rates of 24 labor-exporting countries in 2000. Docquier and Marfouk
(2004) and Docquier and Marfouk (2005) revisit the methodology by collect-
ing data on the immigration structure by educational attainment and country
of birth from all OECD receiving countries. They use harmonised de¯nitions
of educational attainment and distinguish the working-age migration stock
by the country of birth in 1990 and 2000. Thus, the time dimension of this
data set is two small for a panel analysis.
The data set which is employed in this paper has been collected by Defoort
(2006). This data set extends the time dimension of Docquier and Marfouk's
data set but focuses on a limited set of receiving countries. It considers the six
major immigration countries in the OECD (USA, Canada, Australia, UK,
Germany, France), which represents about 75 percent of the OECD stock
of working-aged migrants. For these countries, they rely on Census data
available in 1980, 1990 and 2000 (as well as in 1985 and 1995 in the case of
Australia). These Census data give the structure of immigration by country
19of birth (country of citizenship in the case of Germany) and by educational
attainment. Individuals which have less than 9 years of schooling are de¯ned
as unskilled, and individuals which have 9 years of schooling or more are
considered as skilled.
20Tables
Table 1: Mean share of skilled and unskilled migrants in % of home labour
force and Gini-coe±cients, 1975-2000
variable 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
mean share of skilled mig. 2.43 2.18 2.23 2.22 2.22 2.50
mean share of unskilled mig. 0.71 0.70 0.74 0.75 0.86 0.69
ratio skilled/unskilled mig. sh. 3.42 3.11 3.01 2.96 2.58 3.62
Gini host country 31.14 29.36 30.68 31.53 31.65 31.78
Gini home country 41.94 41.53 41.40 42.24 43.09 43.07
ratio Gini host/ Gini home c. 0.74 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.73 0.74
Sources: Defoort (2006) and own calculations.
Table 2: Expected signs of coe±cients
description variable expected sign
Gini coe±cient host country µjt + -
Gini coe±cient home country µkt + -
GDP per capita di®erential ln(yjt=ykt) -
GDP per capita home ln(ykt) -
distance ln(distjk) +
colonial tie dummy COLONjkt -
bilateral guestworker agreement dummy AGREEjkt -
free movement dummy FREEjkt -
democracy index DEMkt ?
21Table 3: Pooled estimation results
variable (1) (2) (3)
µjt 0.13¤¤¤ 0.14¤¤¤ 0.12¤¤¤
(24.56) (31.13) (26.89)
µkt 0.04¤¤¤ 0.02¤¤¤ 0.02¤¤¤
(23.15) (11.34) (11.35)
ln(yjt=ykt) - -0.47¤¤¤ -0.44¤¤¤
- (-6.13) (-5.70)
ln(ykt) - -0.93¤¤¤ -0.87¤¤¤
- (-12.12) (-11.13)
ln(distjk) - - 0.00¤¤¤
- - (11.76)
COLONkt - - -0.77¤¤¤
- - (-8.95)
AGREEjkt - - -0.07
- - (-1.14)
FREEjkt - - 0.20¤¤
- - (1.98)
DEMOCRACYkt - - -0.14¤¤
- - (-2.37)









Observations 4230 4230 4230
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.42 0.46
RMSE 1.38 1.18 1.13
Notes: ¤¤¤;¤¤ ;¤ indicate signi¯cance levels of
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
22Table 4: Fixed e®ects and GMM estimation results
variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(sh
jk=sl
jk)t¡1 - - - 0.67¤¤¤
- - - (26.34)
µjt 0.01¤¤¤ 0.01¤¤¤ 0.01¤¤¤ 0.04¤¤¤
(9.28) (8.55) (8.88) (9.97)
µkt 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00¤¤
(0.34) (1.28) (1.50) (2.19)
ln(yjt=ykt) - 0.00 -0.01 -0.50¤¤¤
- (0.35) (-0.52) (-5.50)
ln(ykt) - -0.10¤¤¤ -0.13¤¤ -0.51¤¤¤
- (-4.48) (-5.46) (-5.28)
AGREEjkt - - 0.13¤¤¤ -0.45¤¤¤
- - (4.03) (-3.99)
FREEjkt - - 0.18¤¤¤ -0.40¤¤¤
- - (5.19) (-3.01)
DEMOCRACYkt - - -0.02 0.14
- - (-0.87) (1.41)
CONSTANT 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.78¤¤¤










Observations 4230 4230 4230 3525
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.37 0.26 -
F(704,3524)-test statistic 31.95¤¤¤ 22.06¤¤¤ 20.90¤¤¤ -
Hausman Â2-test statistic -2105.48?? 1903.06¤¤¤ 2469.61¤¤¤ -
LR-test statistic for the he-
tero- vs. homoscedastic model 2861.36¤¤¤ 2871.58¤¤¤ 2864.09¤¤¤ -
LR-test statistic for the auto-
vs. the uncorrelated model 141.02 134.27 129.20 -
Hansen's J-test statistic for
overidentifying restrictions - - - 492.02¤¤¤
Arellano-Bond test statistic
for ¯rst-order autocorrelat. - - - -7.86¤¤¤
Arellano-Bond test statistic
for second-order autocorrel. - - - 3.63¤¤¤
Notes: ***, **, * indicate signi¯cance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
23Table A1: Descriptive statistics
variable obs. mean std. dev. min. max.
ln(sh
jt=sl
kt) 4230 1.59 1.55 -3.28 7.75
µjt 4230 31.10 3.92 23.70 39.40
µkt 4230 42.93 11.07 17.80 77.60
ln(yjt=ykt) 4230 2.35 1.63 -1.06 5.87
ln(ykt) 4230 7.59 1.63 4.31 10.93
ln(distjk) 4230 8.74 0.79 5.56 9.86
COLONIALkt 4230 0.09 0.28 0 1
AGREEMENTjkt 4230 0.22 0.41 0 1
FREEjkt 4230 0.05 0.21 0 1
DEMOCRACYkt 4230 0.47 0.36 0 1
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